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Abstract
This paper presents a nonparametric analysis of the canonical habits model. The approach
is based on the combinatorial/revealed preference framework of Samuelson (1948), Houthakker
(1950), Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) and the extenstion and application of these ideas to
intertemporal models in Browning (1989). It provides a simple ﬁnitely computable test of the
model which does not require a parameterisation of the underlying (hypothesised) preferences.
It also yields set identiﬁcation of important features of the canonical habits model including
t h ec o n s u m e r ’ sr a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n dt h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of habit-formation. The ideas
presented are illustrated using Spanish panel data.
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1 Introduction
H a b i t - f o r m a t i o nm o d e l sh a v eb e e nu s e dp r o ﬁtably to analyse a wide variety of micro and macro-
economic phenomena. Micro applications have, for example, included Becker and Murphy’s (1988)
classic study of the price-responsiveness of addictive activities, Meghir and Weber’s (1996) work
on intertemporal nonseparabilities and liquidity constraints and the explanation of asset-pricing
anomalies such as the equity premium puzzle (Abel (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Con-
stantinides (1990)). Macro-orientated studies have used habit-formation models to improve the
ability of business cycle models to explain movements in asset prices (Jermann (1998), Boldrin et
al (2001)), to investigate the idea that economic growth may cause savings rather than the other
way around (Carroll et al (2000)) and to explain the ﬁnding that aggregate spending tends to have
a gradual hump-shaped response to various shocks (Fuhrer (2000)).
Compared to the standard discounted utility model the principal feature of the habit-formation
model is the relaxation of consumption independence. The implication of consumption independence
in the standard discounted utility model is that preferences over consumption in one period are
unaﬀected by consumption in another. Samuelson (1952) was evidently sceptical about this feature
and noted that,
“the amount of wine I drank yesterday and will drink tomorrow can be expected to have
eﬀects upon my today’s indiﬀerence slope between wine and milk”.
Similarly Koopmans (1960), who provided an axiomatic derivation of the discounted utility
model, remarked that
1“One cannot claim a high degree of realism for [consumption independence], because
there is no clear reason why complementarity of goods could not extend over more than
o n et i m ep e r i o d ” .
This, in eﬀect, is an argument against the time-separability of preferences in the discounted
utility framework. The leading example of the kind of behaviour which will give rise to nonsepa-
rabilities is, perhaps, habit formation (Duesenberry (1952), Pollak (1970), Ryder and Heal (1973),
Spinnewyn (1981), and others). In habit formation models1 the consumption vector is typically
partitioned into a group of consumption goods and a group of addictive/habit-forming goods, and
the period-t instantaneous utility function is allowed to depend on both current consumption and
lagged consumption of the habit-forming goods. The eﬀects of habit formation on preferences
over consumption proﬁles and consequent behaviour can be fairly general: i.e. depending on how
much one has already consumed and whether current consumption increases or decreases future
utility, habit formation can lead to preferences for increasing, decreasing or even non-monotonic
consumption proﬁles.
Thus far the empirical literature on habits models has been, to my knowledge, entirely para-
metric. That is to say based on parametrisations of the Euler equation or consumption function
(typically) and of the hypothesised underlying preference structure. The problem which an ap-
proach based on a statistical ﬁt of a parametric model to the data is that any test of the theory
must be a joint one conﬂating a test of the hypothesis of interest with a joint hypothesis regarding
the functional form of the model plus a number of statistical/econometric auxiliary hypotheses. It
therefore does not follow that a rejection of the econometric model necessarily implies a rejection
of the hypothesis of interest. Similarly any model-based empirical identiﬁcation of discount rates
or the welfare eﬀects of habit-formation equally rests on the parametrisation.
This paper asks: what are the nonparametric empirical implications of the habits model? In
particular; are there restrictions involving only data on observables which can allow us to test
the model’s empirical validity and (granted this) to recover its features, i.e. welfare measures and
discount rates? The path which is taken in this paper is based on the nonparametric-revealed
preference approach developed in Samuelson (1948), Houthakker (1950), Afriat (1967) and Varian
(1982) and the extension of these ideas to the life-cycle/permanent income version of the discounted
utility model developed by Browning (1989) who showed how the constancy of the marginal utility
of income across periods can be used to generate ﬁnite linear-programming type restrictions which
only involve data on observables: discounted prices and quantities. These provide a simple yes/no
test of exact, error free, consistency between the data and the theory. Despite the strength of the
assumptions underlying the life cycle-permanent income model, Browning (1989) found that there
were very strong theory-coherent regularities in the post war aggregate data sets for Canada, the
US and the UK.
The beneﬁts of this style of approach are well known2:i ti sd e s i g n e dt ow o r ku s i n gﬁnite (even
small) datasets, it requires only data on observables and it avoids the need to ﬁt parametric (or
indeed nonparametric) statistical models to the data. The downside is that empirical identiﬁca-
tion is necessarily weakened; although to the extent that precise identiﬁcation might ﬂow from
parametric/statistical assumptions this may be no bad thing.
No nonparametric test (in the sense of Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) and Browning (1989))
of the habits model has yet been proposed or implemented. Whilst Kubler (2004) shows that
nonparametric testing of very general intertemporal choice models is not possible, the canonical
habits model is rather special: it is additive and breaks intertemporal separability in a fairly speciﬁc
manner. This paper asks whether the habits model is nonparametrically testable on the basis of
1It is worth noting that habits models bear a great many formal parallels with models of consumer durables
(habit-forming goods being goods which are psychologically durable rather than - or as well as - physically durable),
models of adaptive consumer learning, reference-point models, models incorporating rational anticipation and models
of consumer behaviour under rationing.
2See for example the motivation given in Varian (1982).
2observables. It is shown that it is, and also that the proposed test is a rather straightforward one.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents necessary and suﬃcient empirical con-
ditions for the habits model and describes the implementation of the test. Section 3 sets out the
way in which measurement errors might be accommodated. Section 4 discusses the relationship
between the test described here and other nonparametric tests in the literature (e.g. GARP and
Browning’s (1989) test of the life-cycle/permanent income model). Section 5 presents the empirical
identiﬁcation results for the model. Section 6 applies these ideas to a Spanish Panel dataset. Section
7 concludes.
2N e c e s s a r y a n d s u ﬃcient conditions for the habits model
Suppose that there are T observations indexed3 t =1 ,...,T on a consumer’s demands over time {qt}
and the corresponding prices {pt} and interest rate {it} which they were facing. Let the commodity
vector be partitioned into a group of consumption goods qc
t and a vector of habit-forming goods qa
t
such that qt =[ qc0
t ,qa0
t ]
0. To develop the main ideas without the loss of a great deal of generality,
the discussion will focus on the simplest case in which the eﬀects of lagged consumption of the
addictive goods only persist for one period. This is precisely the type of model considered in, for
example, Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994) inter alia, and it is used here to introduce notation
and to ﬁx ideas before considering the extension to a general lag structure. The discussion of this
extension (which is straightforward) is postponed until the end of this section.
The ﬁrst question is whether it is possible to ﬁnd necessary and suﬃcient empirical conditions
on the observable discounted price and quantity data under which these data are consistent with
the short-memory habits model. To this end, consistency between the habits model and the data
is deﬁned as follows.





satisﬁes the one-lag habits model if there exists a concave, strictly increasing (utility)




































s=2 (1 + is) denotes discounted prices.
This says that the data are consistent with the theory if there exists a well-behaved instantaneous
utility function (deﬁned over the consumption goods and the habit-forming goods plus the one-
period lag of the habit-forming goods), the derivatives of which satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of
optimising behaviour. If such a utility function exists, and we know what it is, then it means that
we can simply plug it into the habits model, solve the model and precisely replicate the observed
demand choices of the consumer. To put it another way, the theory and the data are consistent
if there exists a well-behaved and suitably-conditioned utility function which can provide perfect
within-sample ﬁt of the consumption/demand data.
From Deﬁnition 1 is it clear that the ﬁrst order conditions for the consumption goods are
identical to those of the standard life cycle model. Those for the habit-forming goods are a little
more complex because the current consumption of the habit forming goods aﬀects future utility as
well as current utility. Nevertheless, as ﬁrst pointed out by Spinnewyn (1981), these condition can
3Denote the index set by τ = {1,...,T}.
3be transformed into a form which is analogous to a no-habits model by deﬁning suitable shadow





























Expression (1) is the shadow discounted price of current consumption and measures the willingness-
to-pay for current consumption of the habit-forming goods. Expression (2) is the shadow discounted
price of past consumption and measures the willingness-to-pay for past consumption of the habit-
forming goods. It is worth noting that the shadow discounted price of current consumption can be
interpreted as the (observed) discounted price adjusted to account for the future welfare eﬀects of
























Note that for ap r i o r iharmfully addictive goods past consumption reduces current utility and





t+1 ≤ 0. The empirical/behavioural
implications of the short memory habits model are therefore driven by: (i) links between the
derivatives of discounted utility with respect to future and past consumption of the habit-forming
goods and the (unobservable) shadow discounted prices, and (ii) intertemporal links between the
(unobservable) shadow discounted prices and the (observable) discounted prices. The aim then, is
to turn these insights into testable empirical conditions involving only observables. The following
result for the short-memory habits model can now be given:
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:





isﬁes the one-lag habits model.


































and t ∈ τ, τ = {2,...,T}.
Proof. See the Appendix.¥
Theorem 1 is an equivalence result. It says that if we can ﬁnd suitable shadow prices and a discount
rate such that restrictions (R1) and (R2) hold, then the data are consistent with the theory and there
does indeed exist a well-behaved utility function which gives perfect within-sample rationalisation
of the model. Conversely if we cannot ﬁnd such shadow discounted prices and a discount rate
then there does not exist any theory-consistent utility representation. Restriction (R1) is a cyclical
monotonicity condition4 which is an implication of the concavity of the instantaneous utility function
and the constant marginal utility of lifetime wealth. This condition involves the shadow discounted
prices discussed above. Restriction (R2) is the intertemporal link between the shadow prices.
4Rockafellar, (1970, Theorem 24.8)
4The empirical test is thus a question of searching for shadow price vectors and a discount
rate which satisﬁes the restriction in (R). These restrictions are non-linear in unknowns and look
forbidding but are, in fact, computationally quite straightforward. The important feature to note
is that, conditional on the discount rate, the restrictions are linear in unknowns. This means that,
for any choice of discount rate, we can readily check for the existence or non-existence of feasible
shadow prices in a ﬁnite number of steps using phase one of a linear programme. The issue is then
simply one of conducting an arbitrarily ﬁne one-dimensional grid search over a sensible range5 for
the discount rate and running a linear programming problem at each node6.
To end this section consider a more general model in which consumption of the habit-forming











The deﬁnition of what it means for data to be consistent with the R-lag model and the corresponding
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for theoretical consistency are given in the appendix (Deﬁnition
R and Theorem R). Both are natural extensions of Deﬁnition 1 and Theorem 1. Once more the
restrictions come in the form of a cyclical monotonicity condition and an intertemporal condition
linking the shadow and spot prices of the habit-forming goods. However in this more general model
the lag lengths involved in the consumption vectors are longer and the intertemporal links between
shadow prices extend further. Otherwise the restrictions are multi-period analogies of those in
Theorem 1. Once more the conditions are conditionally linear given a choice of discount rate and
so can be checked by grid search on the discount rate with a linear programming step at each node.
Note that whilst one can test data against the habits model with R lags, there is an empirical
limit for the number of lags at R = T. Indeed if the lag length equals the number of observations on
the consumer then the habits model is untestable/unrejectable because, in essence, any empirically-
relevant degree of time separability has been lost and the result of Kubler (2004) applies. Another
way to think about this is that when the lag length equals the number of observations, one only
has a single complete observation on the consumer - too few to check the dynamic consistency of a
consumer’s behaviour. Of course, when R ≥ T there are no complete observations at all.
3 Allowing for errors
The conditions in Theorems 1 and R are, like all non-parametric/revealed preference type tests,
rather exacting in the sense that if either the consumer’s or the data collector’s “hand trembles”
then the data may be inconsistent with the model even if the deviations induced are very small. One
might be particularly concerned that measurement error could induce violations of the conditions
even though the underlying true data are theory-consistent.




t}t∈τ and let ∆(R) denote the set of all
such datasets which are consistent with the R-lag model
∆(R)={D : D is consistent with the R-lag model} (6)
Then a violation of the empirical conditions for the observed data simply means that the observed
data lie outside the theoretically consistent range
D0 / ∈ ∆(R) (7)
5Since β =1 /(1 + δ),w h e r eδ i st h ec o n s u m e r ’ sr a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eδ ∈ [0,∞] ⇒ β ∈ [0,1].
6Note that with T data points we can only test the one-lag model using T − 1 observations from t =2to T as
one observation is lost per-lag as we construct the x vectors. Also note that whilst it may appear at ﬁrst blush that
there are rows(ρa




t for t =2 ,...,T plus β), in fact the
intertemporal restrictions mean that there are only rows(pa
t )×T +1because, given ρa
t is observed (R2) implies that
once ρ
a,0
t is found, then ρ
a,1
t+1 is tied down as well.
5However, suppose that the data are contaminated by measurement error. Speciﬁcally suppose that
t h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h et r u ed a t aD∗ and the observed data is
D∗ = D0 + E (8)




t}t∈τ represents measurement error which is classical by assumption7.








t}t∈τ. In this case a test statistic for the null





where σ2 is the variance of the measurement error. This is distributed as a χ2
2K(T−1)+T and the null
hypothesis that the true data satisfy the model would be rejected if the test statistic exceeded Cα,
the critical value at the α signiﬁcance level of the chi-squared distribution. Since the true data are
unobserved one can instead compute the minimum perturbation to the data such that the perturbed
data satisfy the model, and use the calculated errors as the basis for making conservative inferences.
Of course the variance of the measurement errors is typically unknown but Varian (1990) suggests
calculating how big it would need to be in order to reject the null and then comparing this to one’s
prior beliefs on the likely size of these errors. Alternatively one may be able to estimate it from a
parametric or nonparametric ﬁt of the data, or from other data sources. This provides a basis for
analysing the model in the presence of measurement errors.
4 The relationship with other nonparametric tests
A natural question concerns how the test proposed in the previous section relate to other nonpara-
metric integrability tests? Speciﬁcally, how does it relate to Browning’s (1989) test of the life-cycle
model/strong rational expectations hypothesis (LCM) and the (Afriat (1967), Varian (1982)) Gen-
eralised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). The ﬁrst result to note is that whilst the test of the
habits model does not imply LCM, and neither is it implied by the LCM conditions, nevertheless
the habits model nests the life cycle model in the following sense.




t}t=1,...,T satisﬁes the R-lag model with ρ
a,r
t =
0 for all t ∈ τ and r ≥ 1 then the data also satisﬁes LCM.
The life cycle model/strong rational expectations hypothesis can therefore be regarded as a
special case of the habits model in which discounted willingness to pay for past consumption is
always zero. The test proposed here can, therefore, be easily adapted to provide a test of the life
cycle model by adding the constraints that ρ
a,r
t = 0 for r ≥ 1 to those in Theorems 1 and R,i n
which case the test becomes identical to that proposed in Browning (1989) (augmented to allow
for time discounting which Browning does not explicitly consider). As a corollary note that this
further restriction also provides the link between the integrability condition for the habits model
and GARP.




t}t∈τ satisﬁes the R-lag model with ρ
a,r
t = 0
for all t ∈ τ and r ≥ 1 then the data also satisﬁes GARP.
7See for example, Varian (1985).
6The intuition is straightforward: if the data satisfy the conditions for the habits model with
this added restriction on the shadow prices then habit formation is eﬀectively ruled out and they
then satisfy the conditions for the life-cycle model. GARP only requires within-period eﬃciency
in expenditure, the life-cycle model however requires more; it requires the eﬃcient within-period
and between-period allocation of expenditure. The LCM condition is therefore over suﬃcient for
GARP.
5I d e n t i ﬁcation
Given a dataset which is consistent with the habits model, the question then arises as to whether
it might be possible to identify parts of the model. In general the restrictions in Theorems 1 and R
will only provide set identiﬁcation in the sense that, if there exist shadow prices and discount rates
which are consistent with the habits model at all, then the constraints deﬁne a set of admissible







t}t∈τ satisﬁes the R-lag model
ª
(10)
The set of theory and data-consistent discount factors is not convex, a fact which stems from the
non-linear nature of the restrictions implied by the model. Since the empirical test proceeds by
means of a grid search on β this means that the empirical identiﬁcation interval for β has “gaps” in
it both at nodes where the conditions may be rejected and also between nodes at untested values
of β. These second class of gaps can be made arbitrarily small by choosing a ﬁner grid.
The other elements of principal interest in the habits model are the willingness-to-pay measures




















Again, given that the data are theory-consistent there will be a set of combinations of shadow prices
and discount factors which will be admissible under the restrictions. The empirical procedure
will return theory-consistent combinations of these parameters and the identiﬁcation set for the













t}t∈τ satisﬁes the R-lag model; β ∈ B (R)
)
(12)
Once more this identiﬁcation set will be non-convex. The non-convexity of P (R) stems from
the non-convexity of B (R). However, once again conditional on β the set of willingness-to-pay
parameters is convex. The issue of how best to represent the set-identiﬁed objects is addressed in
the next section.
6 An empirical implementation: the Spanish Continuous
Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
6.1 Data
The data used here to investigate the empirical implementation of the ideas outlined above is the
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares
- ECPF). The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey of Spanish households which interviews about
3,200 households every quarter. These households are randomly rotated at a rate of 12.5% each
quarter. Thus it is possible to follow a participating household for up to eight consecutive quarters.
7This dataset is a much studied survey which has often been used for the analysis of intertemporal
models and particularly, latterly, the analysis of habits models (for example, Carrasco, Labeaga
and López-Salido, (2005), Browning and Collado (2001, 2005)). The data used here are drawn from
the years 1985 to 1997 and are the selected sub-sample of couples with and without children, in
which the husband is in full-time employment in a non-agricultural activity and the wife is out of the
labour force (this is to minimised the eﬀects of nonseparabilities between consumption demands and
leisure which the empirical appplication does not otherwise allow for). The dataset consists of 21866
observations on 3134 households. The data record household non-durable expenditures and these are
disaggregated into 18 commodity groups (details are in the Appendix). The discounted price data
are calculated from published prices aggregated to correspond to the expenditure categories and
the average interest rate on consumer loans. Note that whilst in these data we observe expenditures
rather than quantities this poses no problems for the application as it is straightforward to adapt
the tests etc. outlined above8.
In what follows the focus is on the consumption of cigarettes - one of the most studied addictive
goods (see for example Chaloupka (1991), Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994), Labeaga (1999),
inter alia). Following these studies it is sensible to look at the special version of the habits model in
which the habit-forming good is bad for the consumer. That is, the version of the model in which
past consumption reduces current utility.
6.2 Results
6.2.1 Test results
The empirical results begin with the analysis of the comparative performance of the Varian (1982)
test of GARP, the Browning (1989) test of the life-cycle/strong rational expectations hypothesis
and the habits model with one and two lags respectively corresponding to one and two quarters.
Each test is run independently for each household in the sample. The data across households is not
pooled at any point. This therefore allows for complete heterogeneity, of unrestricted form across
households with respect to (i) whether or not their behaviour is theory-consistent and (ii) the form
of their preferences (if their behaviour is rationalisable at all). The results are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Pass Rates
Sample GARP Life-cycle Habits (1) Habits (2)
All (N = 3134) 94.19% 1.88% - -
Non-smokers (23.8%) 93.16 % 2.28% - -
Smokers (76.2%) 94.51% 1.76% 43.05% 47.43%
Table 1 shows the pass rates for each test for the full sample, and the sub-samples of smokers
and non-smokers. The ﬁrst column shows the pass rate for the GARP test. Recall that this tests
for consistency between the data and the atemporal consumer choice model in which each period’s
budget is parametric. The results indicate a high level of agreement between the theory and model
with about 94% of the sample satisfying GARP and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the smokers
and non-smokers. The atemporal model out-performs both the life-cycle model and the habits model
by a signiﬁcant degree. However, this is not surprising in because, as discussed above, the empirical










vs denotes element-by-element division of the price vectors and zt and zs denote the vectors of commodity
expenditures.
8requirements of the static demand model are much less stringent than those of the intertemporal
model.
The next column reports the results of Browning’s (1989) test of the life cycle model. It is
found, in contrast to Browning’s study of aggregate data series, that the life-cycle model is heavily
rejected in these microdata. Less than 2 percent of the sample satisfy the conditions required and
whilst the pass rates for non-smokers are higher than those for smokers they are still low. It would
appear that the data are generally inconsistent with the strong rational expectations version of the
life-cycle model.
The last two columns show the pass rates for the habits model. Recall that the life-cycle model
can be regarded as a special case of the habits model in which the welfare eﬀects of past consumption
are restricted to be zero. Habits models are therefore less restrictive than the life-cycle model and
the more lags which are allowed, the less restrictive they progressively become (until the number of
lags equals the number of observations at which point they provide no testable restrictions). The
pass rates for the habits models should therefore be no worse than those for the life-cycle model.
The results in the table show that this is indeed the case with 43 percent of smokers’ behaviour
rationalisable by the one-lag version of the model. Whilst the empirical results show a far better
degree of agreement between the habits model and the data that between the life-cycle model and
the data, the pass rates are far below those of the GARP test. One possibility may be that it is
necessary to admit a longer lag structure. In the ﬁnal column of Table 1 the lags are extended from
one quarter to two. The increase in the pass rate is not enormous. This is probably because the
addictive properties of tobacco are such that the addictive stock dissipates within six months.
To investigate whether or not a household’s consistency with one of these models is correlated
with observables, pass/fail indicators for each household for each model (atemporal, life-cycle and
both habits model) were regressed on a number of standard observable household characteristics9.
The pseudo R2 of the probits were all around the 1% to 2% level and almost none of the coeﬃcients
were individually signiﬁcant. It appears that whether or not a household’s behaviour is likely to be
rationalisable with theory is not predictable on the basis of standard observables.
6.2.2 Allowing for Measurement Errors
For smoking households whose behaviour violates the habits model it is possible, using the ideas
outlined in section 3, to perturb their observed behaviour so that they satisfy the model. As
discussed above, the data we observe are expenditures on commodity groups which are collected
in the ECPF, and corresponding price indices and a consumer interest rate series published by the
Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Given that individual expenditures are recorded in the survey,
but the prices and the interest rate are not, but rather are national time series data, is seems
most likely that, if there is any measurement error, most of it is in the discounted prices. We are
not aware of any speciﬁc studies about price dispersion (or variation in the interest rates at which
diﬀerent households may borrow) in Spain but there is plenty of evidence for it in the UK10 and
there is no reason to expect that Spain is much diﬀerent. In view of this we perturb the discounted
price data for each violating households by the minimum (Euclidean) distance necessary such that
they then satisfy the model.
The results are hard to interpret directly since distance metrics like this depend on the units
involved: in the abscence of an estimate of the variance of the measurement error it is hard to
tell whether the necessary perturbation is big. To help with interpretation the distances have been
translated into R2 ∈ [0,1] values based on how much the perturbations contribute to the ﬁtting of
the nearest theory-consistent values compared to the observed discounted price11.I ft h eo b s e r v e d
9These were {age of the head of household, the number of children in the household and dummy variables for
highest educational qualiﬁcation=university degree, highest educational qualiﬁcation=high school, head’s occupation
= professional/managerial, head’s occupation = skilled, homeowner, renter, drinker}.
10See for example Griﬃth and Leicester (2006).
11The model is ρi∗
t = ρi
t + ei
t -s e es e c t i o n3 .
9discounted prices did satisfy the model the minimum perturbation required would be zero and the
R2 would be 1. To the extent that the data violates the model and larger perturbations are required
then R2 → 0. The interpretation of an R2 around 1 is that the price data are “close” to passing.
The calculation is carried out independently for each household which violates the model and for
each value of the discount rate in the grid search. Figure 1 illustrates the density of the distribution
of R2 values. It shows a right-skewed distribution with 98% of the R2 values greater than 0.9. The
behaviour of many households appears to be close (on this measure) to rationalisable by the model
- the required perturbation to the discounted prices is generally modest.














One interesting exercise is to take the perturbed (and now theoretically-consistent) discounted
prices and to recover from them the implied interest rate which would rationalise the data. This
allows for the fact that the aggregate discounted price data uses the average rate of interest on
consumer loans whilst in reality diﬀerent households might vary widely in the cost of borrowing
which they face. Figure 2 shows the time series of quantiles of the interest rate which emerges from
this.
Figure 2: Rationalisable interest rates






























The solid line in the middle of the ﬁgure is the average consumer interest rate. The dashed lines
surrounding this solid line show quantiles of the distribution of interest rates which are theory-
consistent (i.e those which are implied by the minimum perturbation to the discounted price
data needed to rationalise the data with the model). The outer bounds are the 2.5th and 97.5th
percentiles of the theory-consistent distribution; i.e. 95% of the distribution of theory-consistent
10r a t e sa r ew i t h i nt h e s eb o u n d sw h i c hc a nb es e e nt ob ef a i r l yw i d e-t y p i c a l l y±4 to ±5 percentage
points of the average rate. However, the distribution is quite "peaky": the inner dashed lines show
the 90-10 interval and indicate that 80% of the data are very close (less than about ±0.5 percentage
points ) to the average rate.
To summarise: it appears that only reasonably modest adjustments to the prices and interest
rates faced by individual households are required to rationalise the data.
6.2.3 Identiﬁcation results
Discount rates In the tests conducted above the grid search with respect to the discount rate
was carried out, for every individual household, over the range [0.9,1] using grid points spaced
at 0.005. As noted in section 5 the identiﬁcation region for the discount rate is non-convex and
may contain gaps at values which were inconsistent with observed behaviour and the model. For
each household which satisﬁes the restrictions implied by the one-lag model a set of admissible
discount rates were recovered. Figure 3 illustrates the probability that each discount rate in the
range examined is rationalisable conditional on some discount rate being appropriate. To put it
another way the height of the line records the proportion of times each value of the discount rate
was rationalisable over the sample of rationalisable household. The line is more or less ﬂat. One
way of interpreting this is that, if a household’s behaviour is theory consistent at all, then there is
l i t t l et oc h o o s eb e t w e e nd i ﬀerent discount rates (at least over the range studied).
Figure 3: Theory-consistent consumer discount rates
























The welfare eﬀects of habit-formation There are two main practical diﬃculties with set-
identiﬁcation results discussed above. The ﬁrst is that when there is more than one or at most two,
features of the model which are of interest, ﬁnding a suitable way of illustrating/representing the set
becomes hard. It would be convenient to pick a point within the set which is in some way meaningful,
or representative. This leads to the second problem. This is that whilst the economic theory and
the empirical restrictions they imply tie down the set of theoretically feasible parameter values (or
else indicate that such a set is empty) this set exhausts the (nonparametric) empirical implications
of the theory. The theory cannot, therefore, provide any guidance as to which particular elements
within the set of feasible alternatives are “best”. The familiar idea of “ﬁt” cannot help because for
all feasible values there exists a corresponding well-behaved utility function which exactly ﬁts the
data.
To make further progress one needs to supply a loss function and provide a motivation for
it or to try to recover bounds on the values of the welfare measures. This is computationally
reasonably straightforward: given a discount rate for which there exist feasible shadow price values








for each t in phase two of the linear programming problem and thereby ﬁnd








/λ in each period. This will provide bounds on the
welfare eﬀects of past consumption on utility in each period. Note that these bounds will generally
be mutually inconsistent as they will have been found by independent minimisation (for all welfare
eﬀects simultaneously to achieve their bounds may not be a feasible solution). Nevertheless these
bounds are useful and robust pieces of information about the consumer’s preferences and allow us
to make statements of the kind: the absolute value of the welfare eﬀects of habit-formation are at
least x.
Figure 4: The density of the distribution of welfare eﬀects

















Figure 3 shows the density of the distribution of welfare eﬀects for households whose behaviour
is consistent with the short memory model. There is a long lower tail of the distribution which
has been truncated in the ﬁgure. A mode is evident around -0.075 with another smaller mass
point around -0.35. The median sample value is -0.1495. This is a standard willingness to pay
measure (marginal utility of the object of interest relative to the marginal utility of income). The
interpretation is therefore that on average amongst households whose behaviour is rationalisable
with the model, the negative marginal eﬀects of tobacco habit-formation are at least about one
seventh of those of a marginal decrease in income.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has derived general combinatorial/nonparametric conditions for the canonical habits
model. The test proposed in the paper is shown to be computationally straightforward and set
identiﬁcation results for certain features of the model are available. The ideas outlined have been
applied to a Spanish panel dataset in which it appears that, while the life-cycle model is very heavily
rejected, for smokers at least the addition of habit formation to the discounted utility model improves
the rationalisability of the data considerably. For households who were non-rationalisable it was
shown that rather modest adjustments to prices and interest rates were suﬃcient to bring their
expenditure behaviour in line with the model. For households whose behaviour is captured by the




P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 .
(T) ⇒ (R):Deﬁnition 1 and the deﬁnitions of the shadow discounted prices in (??)a n d( 3 )i m p l y





















¤0 . The concavity of the instantaneous
utility function u(xt) means
u(xs) − u(xt) ≤ +Du(xt)
0 (xs − xt) ∀ t,s ∈ τ (P2)
Therefore concavity (P2) and optimising behaviour (P1) together imply that
u(xs) ≤ u(xt)+λπ0
t (xs − xt) ∀ t,s ∈ τ (P3)
Now consider any subset of observations from τ and denote this subset by σ. Then summing across





s (xt − xs) ∀σ ⊆ τ (P4)
which is restriction (R1).
(R) ⇒ (T):Restriction (R1) is a cyclical monotonicity condition (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 24.8).
Cyclical monotonicity for the data {πt,xt}t∈τ and the deﬁnition of πt implies that there exists a


























































Backdating (P6) (which must hold for all t) substitute for ρ
a,0











































13P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .Consider, without loss of generality the test for the one-lag habits model.
If ρ
a,1
t =0for all t ∈ τ then, from (R2) in Proposition 1 ρa
t = ρ
a,0










































s (qt − qs) ∀σ ⊆ τ
which is condition for the life-cycle model in Browning (Deﬁnition 1 and Proposition 1, (1989))
extended to allow for β 6=1 .¥
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 .This follows immediately from Theorem 2 and Browning ((1989), Propo-
sition 2). This is because GARP is a condition under which the data are consistent with a model
of stable preferences and weak intertemporal separability. The conditions for SREH are stronger:
additively time-separable and stable preferences.¥
The R-lag habits model





satisﬁes the R-lag habits model if there exists a concave, strictly increasing (utility) function u(.)






































where k ≡ t + r for all t ∈ {R +1 ,....,T}
Theorem R. The following statements are equivalent:










































and t ∈ {R +1 ,....,T}.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e mR .The proof is analogous toTheorem 1 by induction on R.¥
14B. Variable deﬁnitions
The commoditiy groups are as follows: Food and non-alcoholic drinks at home; Alcohol; Tobacco;
Clothing and footwear; House rent (includes imputed rent); Energy at home (heating by electricity);
Services at home (heating not electricity, water, furniture repair); Non-durables at home (clean-
ing products); Nondurable medicines; Medical services; Transportation; Petrol; Leisure (cinema,
theatre, clubs for sports); Education; Personal services; Personal non-durables (toothpaste, soap);
Personal small items (combs, jewellery, lighters); Restaurants and bars.
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